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DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION: DEVELOPMENT OF THE ENERGY RESOURCES OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Energy exploration and development trends in developing countries

Report of the Secretary-General

SUMMARY

In its resolution 45/209 of 21 December 1990, the General Assembly welcomed the report of the Secretary-General on energy exploration and development trends in developing countries and the outline of a programme of action for the acceleration of energy exploration and development in developing countries; called upon interested Member States, in cooperation with the appropriate organs, organizations and bodies of the United Nations system, to continue to explore ways and means to support the efforts of developing countries in the exploration and development of their energy resources; and requested the Secretary-General to submit a comprehensive report on the implementation of the resolution.

The present report analyses trends in energy consumption and production in the developing countries and focuses on problems and issues over the next 20 years, with particular reference to the energy-deficient developing countries.

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* A/47/50.

Recent trends in energy consumption, particularly in the developing countries of Asia that have experienced considerable economic growth, have further demonstrated that development will be accompanied by higher energy intensities.

Oil and gas will continue to dominate energy balances in developing countries. High growth in electricity consumption will require a near doubling of installed production capacity by the year 2000. In order to meet the expected growth in energy demand, developing countries will face massive capital mobilization requirements, which may be exacerbated by environmental considerations.

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Abbreviations and symbols used

1.	b/d	barrels per day
2.	bmt	billion metric tons
3.	C.Eur.	Central Europe
4.	C.I.S.	Commonwealth of Independent States
5.	DCs	Developing Countries
6.	DMEs	Developed Market Economies
7.	E.Eur.	Eastern Europe
8.	GDP	Gross Domestic Product
9.	Lat.Amer.	Latin America
10.	mb/d	millions barrels per day
11.	Mid.East	Middle East
12.	mtoe	million metric tons of oil equivalent
13.	N.Amer.	North America
14.	OExDCs	Oil Exporting Developing Countries
15.	OIDC	Oil Importing Developing Countries
16.	OPEC	Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries
17.	U.S.A.	United States of America
18.	UAE	United Arab Emirates
19.	W.Eur.	Western Europe
20.	%	per cent

I. INTRODUCTION

1. Since the previous report of the Secretary-General which was submitted during the first half of 1990 (A/45/274-E/1990/73 and Corr.1), the crisis in the Persian Gulf and political developments in Central and Eastern European countries and the former USSR have had considerable direct and indirect impact on energy exploration and development in the developing world.

2. Following the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq on 2 August 1990, the trade embargo imposed by Security Council resolution 661 (1990) cut off more than 4 million barrels per day (mb/d) of exports from these two countries or 7 per cent of world consumption. This, and market speculation, resulted for a while in a doubling and tripling of oil prices with consequent shock effects on many oil importing developing countries.

3. In the message of the Secretary-General to the Ministerial Seminar of Petroleum Producers and Consumers, which was held in Paris on 1 and 2 July 1991 at the joint invitation of the Governments of France and Venezuela, it was stated 1/ that:

> "The recent crisis has brought to the fore, once again, the vulnerability of these countries, especially the least developed countries among them. The Security Council's decision to impose sanctions on Iraq has had a grave impact on the economies of the developing world, causing more than 20 countries to seek recourse under Article 50 of the Charter. The developed market economies had ample strategic oil reserves and commercial stockpiles. The developing world and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe had no adequate stocks of their own and had to bear the negative consequences."

4. The decision of member countries Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) at their meeting in August 1990 to augment oil supplies by producing at full production capacity was taken with an explicit declaration that the objective was to meet the oil requirements of the developing world. 2/ While the loss of exports from Iraq and Kuwait was quickly made up with additional supplies from other member countries of OPEC, especially Saudi Arabia, many developing countries experienced shortages, with consequent losses of economic output. At the same time higher oil prices compounded the foreign exchange problem of these countries. It has been estimated that during the Persian Gulf crisis of August 1990 to January 1991 the incremental foreign exchange outlay for the oil imports of the developing countries amounted to as much as US$ 10 billion, or about a third more of their normal annual oil import bill. 3/ If these funds were to be invested in indigenous oil production they could augment supplies by 1 mb/d, or a doubling of current output. Scattered evidence suggests that special arrangements on a bilateral basis and loans from multilateral institutions cushioned the adverse impact in some developing countries. However, these measures fell short of requirements in view of the magnitude of the problem, especially in the least developed

countries and other developing countries, which suffered additional losses because of major trade relationships with Iraq and Kuwait.

5. Prior to the Persian Gulf crisis anticipation of continued economic growth and consequent increases in world oil demand had already led to the consideration of new arrangements between host oil exporting developing countries and international oil companies for new investments to expand production capacities. At the same time both oil exporting and importing developing countries, as well as the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, had initiated measures for the reorganization and in some cases privatization of national oil enterprises and the provision of incentives for more direct foreign investments in their petroleum industries.

6. Much of this effort was stalled during the Persian Gulf crisis. Since then the deepening of economic recession in many of the developed market economies and depression in several of the formerly centrally planned economies of Central and Eastern Europe have led to only marginal increases in global oil demand and a drop in oil prices to their pre-Persian Gulf crisis levels. At the same time increasing environmental concerns, particularly with regard to the contribution of fossil fuels to carbon dioxide emissions and climate warming as well as intensive consideration of special taxes aimed at the reduction of fossil fuel consumption, have led to increasing uncertainties which have caused hesitations in commitments for large-scale capital intensive energy projects.

7. As emphasized in the previous report of the Secretary-General, analysis of trends on the demand side of the energy picture during the past two decades has clearly demonstrated that economic development in the developing world had been accompanied by higher energy intensities. In other words, more energy is needed now than previously for every US$ 1,000 of gross domestic product in the developing world (A/45/274-E/1990/73 and Corr.1, table 4). More recent trends in energy consumption, particularly in the fast growing developing economies of Asia have demonstrated further the validity of that conclusion.

8. Forecasts to the year 2010 prepared by the Secretariat indicate that energy demand in the developing countries will grow at an average annual rate of 4.4 per cent, which is much higher than the expected growth in the developed market economies of 1.8 per cent.

9. Half of the increase in world energy demand will be in the developing countries. The share of these countries in world energy consumption will increase to 35 per cent by the year 2010, as compared to 26 per cent in 1990. However, on a per capita basis, only marginal improvement can be expected in the current condition, where the level of energy consumption in the developing world is around 10 per cent of that in the developed market economies.

10. Oil will continue to dominate commercial energy consumption in the developing world. Coal will retain its overall position and it will be of great importance to a few countries, especially China and India. Natural gas

will strengthen its position as the third most important fuel and will be more widely used. The fast growth in electricity consumption, which is a worldwide phenomenon, will continue. In the absence of technological breakthroughs in new and renewable sources of energy, the contribution of such sources to the overall energy picture of the developing world will remain static, although the significance of biomass in rural areas and hydropower for overall electrification will continue. 4/

11. Massive capital investments and the application of modern technologies will be required in the energy sector of the developing countries in order to meet increasing domestic demand. Similar investments will be required in order to augment energy production capacities, particularly in oil and increasingly in natural gas for exports to the developed market economies and other net energy importing countries.

12. In view of the foreign indebtedness of so many of the developing countries, the magnitude of the scarcity of capital, which has extended even to the few traditionally capital-surplus oil exporting developing countries, reduced direct foreign investment and inadequate support from bilateral and multilateral financial sources, new arrangements will be required in order to promote international cooperation in this crucial field of the world economy.

II. TRENDS IN ENERGY CONSUMPTION

13. The share of developing countries in the world commercial energy consumption has grown consistently over the past two decades, from 13 per cent in 1970 to 26 per cent in 1990, as shown in figure 1 and table 1, while the world commercial energy consumption increased by 60.3 per cent to a total of 7,189.8 million metric tons of oil equivalent (mtoe) in 1990.

14. During the period 1980-1990, consumption of commercial energy in developing countries increased by 57.4 per cent for an annual growth rate of 4.2 per cent. In comparison, energy demand in the developed market economies during the same period grew by only 8.6 per cent for an annual growth rate of 0.8 per cent. This disparity in growth patterns of commercial energy consumption is the result of energy conservation and efficiency measures as well as structural changes in the economies of the developed market economies that have experienced considerable economic growth rates with lower energy intensities. In the developing world, however, structural changes in their economies have invariably led to higher energy intensities per unit of economic output. These trends may be expected to continue until certain levels of national income are achieved that may be followed by less energy intensive structures.

Figure 1. Commercial primary energy consumption a/

(Million tons of oil equivalent)



Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Development, based on the Energy Statistics Yearbook, various issues.

a/ C.Eur = Central Europe
CIS = Commonwealth of Independent States
DCs = Developing countries
DMEs = Developed market economies
OExDCs = Oil exporting developing countries
OIDC = Oil importing developing countries
OPEC = Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries

Table 1. Commercial primary energy consumption

(Million tons of oil equivalent)

		1970	1980	1985	1989	1990
Developed market economies	Oil	1 432.0	1 665.3	1 493.0	1 613.3	1 600.1
	Gas	659.6	765.2	741.8	804.3	813.8
	Coal	718.4	784.2	880.8	992.7	991.0
	Electricity	77.9	142.1	200.7	231.3	240.5
	Total	2 887.9	3 356.8	3 316.3	3 641.6	3 645.4
Central Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States	Oil	271.1	465.7	437.0	457.0	440.3
	Gas	192.2	385.6	548.3	623.7	640.9
	Coal	518.1	589.2	600.3	596.0	541.1
	Electricity	12.1	25.0	38.2	46.1	46.1
	Total	993.5	1 465.5	1 623.8	1 722.8	1 668.4
All developing countries	Oil	267.1	554.5	611.5	717.0	742.5
	Gas	49.6	131.9	182.0	254.0	265.0
	Coal	270.5	463.2	644.7	782.0	794.0
	Electricity	16.8	42.4	60.5	71.0	74.5
	Total	604.0	1 192.0	1 498.7	1 824.0	1 876.0
Members countries of OPEC	Oil	37.6	110.6	150.0	170.4	171.1
	Gas	24.2	57.6	81.4	125.7	134.7
	Coal	1.0	1.6	2.6	4.5	4.8
	Electricity	0.8	2.4	3.6	5.2	5.3
	Total	63.6	172.2	237.6	305.8	315.9
Oil exporting developing countries	Oil	70.0	163.6	192.1	230.0	239.7
	Gas	16.8	50.0	59.6	67.5	69.7
	Coal	179.8	310.3	427.7	534.3	545.9
	Electricity	4.9	10.3	15.2	18.1	18.8
	Total	271.5	534.2	694.6	849.9	874.1
Oil importing developing countries	Oil	159.5	280.3	269.4	316.6	331.7
	Gas	8.6	24.3	41.0	60.8	60.6
	Coal	89.7	151.3	214.4	243.2	243.3
	Electricity	11.1	29.7	41.7	47.7	50.4
	Total	268.9	485.6	566.5	668.3	686.0
Total world	Oil	1 970.2	2 685.5	2 541.5	2 787.3	2 782.9
	Gas	901.4	1 282.7	1 472.1	1 682.0	1 719.7
	Coal	1 507.0	1 836.6	2 125.8	2 370.7	2 326.1
	Electricity	106.8	209.5	299.4	348.4	361.1
	Total	4 485.4	6 014.3	6 438.8	7 188.4	7 189.8

Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Development, based on the Energy Statistics Yearbook, various issues.

15. The composition of world commercial primary energy consumption by source and consumption patterns in 1990 by groups of countries are shown in figures 2 and 3. There were marked differences in consumption patterns among the various groups of countries, and among the developing countries the pattern of consumption varied significantly. In the OPEC member countries, oil and gas accounted for practically all of the primary energy consumed. Although coal accounted for a significant proportion in the consumption pattern of the non-OPEC developing countries, it should be noted that its use was dominant mainly in China and India only.

16. The per capita consumption of commercial energy in the developing countries continues to be very low, as shown in figure 4.

17. The level of commercial energy consumption in developing countries in 1990 as compared with 1985 increased by 377 mtoe, with coal contributing to this increase 149 mtoe, oil 131 mtoe, natural gas 83 mtoe and primary electricity 14 mtoe. These increases, except for electricity, were higher than in the developed market economies. Most of the developing countries continue to depend on oil as the major source for their commercial energy requirements: an increasing amount of oil has to be imported.

18. Historic oil demand data for the developing countries consuming more than 200,000 barrels per day of oil and ranked according to their levels of oil demand in 1990 are shown in table 2.

19. About 79 per cent of the oil demand of the developing countries in 1990 was accounted for by the 21 countries listed in table 2. During the period 1985-1990, much of the growth in oil demand was in the Asia and the Pacific region, with Malaysia, Pakistan and Taiwan Province of China registering annual growth rates of over 8 per cent, and the Republic of Korea and Thailand registering over 14 per cent. In China and India, oil demand rose by over 4 per cent annually in the period.

Figure 2. World consumption of commercial primary energy and its composition



	1970	1980	1985	1990	Change in primary energy source 1980 / 1970		1990 / 1980	
					mtoe	%	mtoe	%
Oil	1 970	2 686	2 542	2 783	716	36.3	97	3.6
Gas	901	1 283	1 472	1 720	382	42.4	437	34.1
Electricity	107	210	299	361	103	96.3	151	71.9
Coal	1 507	1 836	2 126	2 326	329	21.8	490	26.7

Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Development, based on the Energy Statistics Yearbook, various issues.

Figure 3. Commercial energy consumption patterns 1990, by group of countries a/



	DMEs	C.Eur.&C.I.S.	OPEC	OExDC	OIDC	World
Oil	43.8	26.3	54.1	27.4	48.3	38.7
Gas	22.4	38.4	42.6	7.9	8.8	23.8
Electricity	6.6	2.8	1.7	2.2	7.3	5.1
Coal	27.1	32.4	1.5	62.4	35.5	32.3

Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Development, based on the Energy Statistics Yearbook, various issues.

a/ C.Eur = Central Europe
CIS = Commonwealth of Independent States
DMEs = Developed market economies
OExDCs = Oil exporting developing countries
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Figure 4. Per capita consumption of primary commercial energy



Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Development, based on the Energy Statistics Yearbook, various issues.

Table 2. Oil demand in selected developing countries

	Thousands of barrels per day				Growth rates (percentage)		
	1980	1985	1989	1990	1980-1985	1985-1990	1989-1990
China	1 221	1 436	1 780	1 803	2.9	4.3	1.3
Mexico	1 083	1 258	1 458	1 524	2.7	3.5	4.5
Brazil	948	793	967	961	-2.7	3.5	-0.6
India	508	710	912	912	6.6	4.8	0.0
Republic of Korea	454	445	665	824	-0.4	14.2	24.0
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	493	602	786	807	3.7	5.7	2.7
Saudi Arabia	331	713	713	739	19.2	0.6	3.6
Indonesia	421	487	493	503	2.6	0.5	1.9
Taiwan Province of China a/	369	321	472	480 b/	-2.2	9.4	...
Thailand	230	215	333	400	-1.1	14.3	20.2
Egypt	237	316	379	390	5.6	3.9	2.8
Argentina	452	361	370	345	-3.4	-0.7	-6.9
Venezuela	354	406	345	342	2.4	-2.6	-0.8
Malaysia	153	181	227	275	3.0	8.7	21.4
Philippines	206	140	205	213	-5.3	8.7	4.1
Nigeria	136	148	220	212	1.5	7.2	-3.6
Singapore	167	152	187	211	-1.5	6.5	12.5
Cuba	189	194	221	210	0.5	1.4	-5.0
Iraq	124	132	246	209	1.1	9.7	-15.0
Pakistan	87	136	187	205	9.3	8.5	9.9
Total	8 164	9 146	11 166	11 565	2.0	3.7	3.5

Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Development, based on the Energy Statistics Yearbook, various issues.

a/ Data from Annual oil market report, 1990, International Energy Agency.

b/ Estimate.

III. TRENDS IN ENERGY EXPLORATION, DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION

A. Crude oil

20. Although oil supplies have become geographically more diversified over the past 20 years, with commercial deposits found in around 80 countries, the world's remaining oil is very unevenly distributed, with most of it located primarily in the Persian Gulf area. In terms of proved reserves, the Middle East, in particular in the Persian Gulf area, holds about two thirds of the world's reserves (see fig. 5). 5/ The large Arabian-Iranian downwarp sedimentary basin is the most petroliferous geological province in the world.

21. As shown in table 3 and figure 6, oil supplies from the developing countries have increased substantially over the past 20 years. Among the non-OPEC oil exporting developing countries, production has more than tripled (from 0.972 to 3.789 billion barrels per year between 1970 and 1991), improving their share of the total world's oil production from 5.9 per cent to 17.3 per cent. In the energy deficient developing countries, oil production has almost doubled, to over 0.764 billion barrels a year. 6/

22. Current total annual oil production from OPEC is about the same level as in 1970, but its share of the world total production has declined from a high of 51.2 per cent to 38.5 per cent. Nevertheless, the share of OPEC countries is expected to increase because of the magnitude of their proved reserves.

23. Increased production from non-OPEC countries between the mid-1970s and mid-1980s was based largely on substantial discoveries in four major areas, the North Sea, Mexico, Alaska and the Commonwealth of Independent States.

24. Most of the world's oil production comes from super giant fields containing in excess of 5 billion barrels of recoverable oil each. World wide only 38 of these super giant fields have been discovered but they contain over half of all the oil discovered to date. Although these 38 oil fields produced much the same in 1991 as in 1975, there is clear evidence that a number of those fields are already in decline. For example, Prudhoe Bay in Alaska and Samatlor in Russia have entered their decline phase, as has the developed part of the Ghawar field in Saudi Arabia. Also, some of the fields in the Islamic Republic of Iran have reportedly encountered problems with gas handling and water breakthrough. 7/

25. Another 300 or so giant oil fields contributed 30 per cent of the world proved reserves. The remaining 15 per cent or so of the world's reserves are contained in much smaller fields and the large majority of those fields do not significantly impact on world oil production.

Figure 5. World proved oil reserves

(At year end)



	1960	1970	1980	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991
USA	32	39	20	27	27	25	27	26	26	26
Latin America	25	26	69	83	84	89	114	125	121	120
Commonwealth of Independent States	63	63	63	63	61	59	59	58	57	57
Rest of the world	116	141	134	127	130	125	124	132	132	153
Middle East	183	344	362	398	398	402	564	660	663	662

Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Development, based on the Oil and Gas Journal Energy Database.

Table 3. World crude oil production

(Thousands of barrels)

Country	1970	1980	1985	1989	1990	1991
OPEC countries	8 508 939	9 781 765	5 869 571	7 922 802	8 476 760	8 521 574
Share of world total a/	51.2	45.0	30.2	36.6	38.5	39.0
Oil exporting developing countries	972 463	2 438 974	3 135 439	3 540 503	3 646 058	3 789 138
Share of world total a/	5.9	11.2	16.1	16.3	16.6	17.3
Energy-deficient developing countries	318 944	401 639	704 959	706 350	763 288	764 383
Share of world total a/	1.9	1.8	3.6	3.3	3.5	3.5
Developed market economies	4 102 900	4 598 943	5 242 650	4 926 110	4 844 572	4 973 673
Share of world total a/	24.7	21.1	27.0	22.7	22.0	22.7
Central Europe and Commonwealth of Independent States	2 707 504	4 525 270	4 466 163	4 577 465	4 285 465	3 820 820
Share of world total a/	16.3	20.8	23.0	21.1	19.5	17.5
World total	16 610 750	21 746 591	19 418 782	21 673 230	22 016 143	21 869 887

Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Development, based on the Energy Statistics Yearbook, various issues, and Oil and Gas Journal, 30 December 1991.

a/ Percentage.

Figure 6. World oil and gas production a/



Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Development, based on the Energy Statistics Yearbook, various issues.

a/ b/d = barrels per day
cu m/d = cubic metres per day

26. Oil production is distributed widely, as shown in table 4, where the countries are ranked in order of their projected ultimate recovery of 5 billion barrels and more. The oil contained in proved reserves at present could lead to a perception of an enormous resource base. However, if there are no additions to these reserves from new discoveries, maintaining and increasing production would come from additions that are incremental to existing production. Production from an oil field cannot be sustained indefinitely as production will reach a natural plateau and then decline. Even the largest of oilfields cannot sustain plateau production indefinitely.

27. In the short term production capacity can be increased through over-production, an accelerated rate of depletion of developed reserves, and by bringing back onstream shut-in production capacities, especially those in the OPEC Persian Gulf countries. This was the case in making up the shortfall in supply from the loss of production of about 4.3 mb/d from Kuwait and Iraq during the Persian Gulf crisis. Shut-in production capacity was rushed into service in the latter part of 1990 and early 1991. The need to make up the supply deficit allowed Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and other countries like Nigeria and Venezuela to produce at or near capacity. Saudi Arabia increased its production to 8.5 mb/d in the second half of 1990, and to an average daily production of 8.2 mb/d in 1991 from an average daily production of only 5.13 mb/d in 1989. With the loss of production from Kuwait and Iraq replaced and oil demand stalling for economic reasons, the oil market in 1991 was almost in balance, moderating the volatility of crude oil prices, which reached a peak of US$ 41/barrel not long after the Iraqi invasion but dropped to US$ 20/barrel through the end of 1991. The replacement production capacity has remained on stream since, albeit with little to spare.

28. Although the magnitude of world proved oil reserves has increased considerably during the past 30 years (see figure 6), most of the increases, especially during the second half of the 1980s, were due to revisions of estimates rather than the discovery of new oilfields. In fact new oil found has been much lower than total production during the period.

29. The primary reasons for the decline in the level of new field discoveries are the substantial decrease in exploration spending and the location of exploration activity. During the period 1985-1990, it is estimated that exploration spending by the largest 30 oil companies fell by 25 per cent. Major oil companies have been replacing their production in recent years mainly through acquisition of reserves. 8/

30. The location of exploration activity is also crucial. During the past decade exploration activity has been concentrated in and around known areas, in many cases mature areas where the largest fields had already been found. New oil and gas reserves will not be found unless new areas are explored or oil companies have sufficient incentives to explore the more costly or technically complex possibilities in known provinces.

Table 4. World oil distribution

(Billion barrels)

Country	Cumulative production	1991 production	Proved reserves	Reserves: production ratio	Probable a/ reserves addition	Remaining oil	Total oil
Saudi Arabia b/	62.4	3.03	257.8	86:1	42	299.8	362.20
Commonwealth of Independent States	112.2	3.74	57.0	15:1	124	181.0	293.20
United States of America	158.0	2.69	26.3	10:1	71	97.3	255.30
Iran, Islamic Republic of b/	39.1	1.22	92.9	76:1	52	144.9	184.00
Iraq b/	22.4	1.03 c/	100.0	100:1	45	145.0	167.40
Venezuela b/	44.7	0.85	59.0	69:1	38	97.0	141.70
Kuwait b/	26.5	0.64 c/	94.0	147:1	4	98.0	124.50
United Arab Emirates b/	12.6	0.88	98.1	111:1	49	147.1	159.70
Mexico	17.5	1.01	52.0	51:1	52	104.0	121.50
China	15.7	1.02	24.0	24:1	48	72.0	87.70
Canada	14.3	0.56	5.6	10:1	33	38.6	52.90
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya b/	17.4	0.55	22.8	41:1	8	30.8	48.20
Nigeria b/	13.4	0.68	17.9	26:1	9	26.9	40.30
Indonesia b/	13.7	0.52	6.6	13:1	10	16.6	30.30

Table 4 (continued)

Country	Cumulative production	1991 production	Proved reserves	Reserves: production ratio	Probable a/ reserves addition	Remaining oil	Total oil
Norway	4.0	0.68	7.6	11:1	22	29.6	33.60
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	10.3	0.65	4.0	6:1	13	17.0	27.30
Algeria b/	8.3	0.29	9.2	32:1	2	11.2	19.50
Egypt	5.2	0.32	4.5	14:1	5	9.5	14.70
India	3.0	0.24	6.1	25:1	3	9.1	12.10
Brazil	2.9	0.23	2.8	12:1	8	10.8	13.70
Australia	3.3	0.20	1.5	8:1	5	6.5	9.80
Oman	3.3	0.26	4.3	17:1	2	6.3	9.60
Argentina	5.3	0.17	1.1	19:1	2	3.1	8.40
Malaysia	2.2	0.23	3.1	13:1	4	7.1	9.30
Qatar b/	4.4	0.14	3.7	26:1	2	5.7	10.10
Colombia	3.1	0.16	2.0	12:1	2	4.0	7.10
Tunisia	0.8	0.04	1.7	43:1	4	5.7	6.50
Romania	4.7	0.05	1.2	24:1	1	2.2	6.90
Yemen	0.2	0.07	4.0	57:1	2	6.0	6.20
Ecuador b/	1.7	0.11	1.6	14:1	3	4.6	6.30
Angola	1.7	0.18	1.8	10:1	2	3.8	5.50

Table 4 (continued)

Country	Cumulative production	1991 production	Proved reserves	Reserves: production ratio	Probable a/ reserves addition	Remaining oil	Total oil
Brunei Darussalam	2.0	0.05	1.4	28:1	2	3.4	5.40
Peru	1.8	0.04	0.4	10:1	3	3.4	5.20
Trinidad and Tobago	2.6	0.05	0.5	10:1	2	2.5	5.10

Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Development, based on the report, "Dominant Middle East oil reserves critically important to world supply", by J. P. Riva Jr., Oil and Gas Journal, 23 September 1991.

Note: Some countries, like Gabon and Cameroon, are not mentioned in the table owing to lack of information on probable reserves addition.

a/ Probable reserves addition are comprised of estimated field growth and undiscovered recoverable resources.

b/ OPEC member country.

c/ Annual oil productions of Iraq and Kuwait shown are for 1989, that is, prior to the Gulf War, for more realistic levels.

31. The geology of almost all of the world's sedimentary basins is at least partially known. Although substantial new oil remains to be discovered, geological inferences indicate that it is likely to be in smaller accumulations and widely scattered.

32. Many sedimentary basins in the developing world remain under-explored. This is due to several factors, including geological prospectivity with probability of smaller deposits, political instability, jurisdictional disputes with neighbouring States, pricing policies for domestic marketing and comparatively inadequate incentives for direct foreign investment in this sector. Yet for many oil importing developing countries even small oil discoveries could make all the difference in meeting their energy requirements without intolerable foreign exchange problems.

1. Member countries of OPEC

33. During the second half of the 1980s, large increases in oil reserves were announced in some member countries of OPEC: Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and United Arab Emirates. In most cases these large increases in the reserves were not related to new field discoveries. They were based mainly on increasing recovery factors in existing fields. Production capacities in several OPEC countries, especially those in the Persian Gulf, are not limited by the physical constraints of reserves. In most of these countries oil output is limited only by voluntary ceilings based on world demand for OPEC oil.

34. Prior to the Gulf War, OPEC countries had planned to boost their oil output capacity in anticipation of an expected upturn in world oil demand, which would be met largely from OPEC supplies. Plans by the OPEC Persian Gulf countries were to add some 6.05 mb/d of new capacity by 1995 and a further 1.9 mb/d by the year 2000. 9/ Many of these projects, especially in Saudi Arabia, are now being implemented. Table 5 reflects some of these trends.

35. During the period 1982-1990, seismic activity was at a record level in 1990, with about 160,078 line-kilometres surveyed, almost double the level of 1986. Similarly, exploratory wells completed, 310 wells in 1990, represented a gain of 28 per cent compared with the level in 1986. Development wells completed also rose sharply to 1,178 wells in 1990, largely from increased drilling in Indonesia and Venezuela. The rising trend in exploration and development activities in OPEC countries is expected to continue in order to maximize sustainable crude oil production to meet the projected growth in world demand, coupled with declining production from the Commonwealth of Independent States and the United States of America. Clearly, OPEC alone has the capacity for expansion to meet any significant growth in world oil demand. Moreover, OPEC has control of the lowest cost oil, which, together with its surplus supply situation, would imply that OPEC production capacity and capacity utilization remain the major determinants of the price of oil.

Table 5. Exploration and development indicators of OPEC member countries, (1982-1990)

Year	Licensed area (thousand sq km)	Seismic activity (line-km)	Exploratory drilling (number of wells)	Development drilling (number of wells)
1982	2 707	137 670	606 a/	2 705 a/
1983	2 565	128 554	474	2 031
1984	2 414	116 186	454	1 577
1985	2 178	101 923	358	1 224
1986	2 312	86 971	242	946
1987	4 202	91 367	258	803
1988	4 384	113 346	267	960
1989	4 530	143 228	285	969
1990	3 716	160 078	310	1 178

Source: World Petroleum Trends 1991, Petroconsultants (United Kingdom) Ltd.

a/ Includes unusually high level of drilling in Venezuela in the Orinoco tar belt for heavy oil.

36. Production expansion projects remain the focus among the OPEC countries and in some countries exploration and production sectors have been opened to foreign participation. Venezuela has announced plans to open development of marginal fields to both private and overseas interests for the first time since nationalization of its oil industry in 1976.

37. The Islamic Republic of Iran continued to restore its production capacity to about the level prior to the Iran-Iraq war, when peak output was about 5 mb/d; however, drilling has remained at a low level. Restoration of offshore production was being emphasized. Several new drilling rigs have been purchased from Canada and the United States, which would lead to an acceleration of the programme for capacity expansion. In addition protocols have been signed with foreign oil companies for offshore development.

38. The potential production levels of the OPEC member countries can be many and varied in relation to future patterns of supply and demand, prices and political and economic acceptability. Table 6 shows estimates of effective production capacities for 1990 and the year 2000.

Table 6. Estimated effective and potential oil production capacity of OPEC member countries

(Million b/d)

Country	Estimated effective capacity	Possible capacity in 2000
Algeria	1	1
Ecuador	0.5	0.5
Gabon	0.3	0.3
Indonesia	1.5	1.5
Iran, Islamic Republic of	3	4
Iraq	3.5	5
Kuwait	2	3
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	1.5	2
Nigeria	2	2
Qatar	0.5	0.5
Saudi Arabia	10	12
United Arab Emirates	2	2.5
Venezuela	2.5	3

Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Development, based on the report, "Oil export capacity in OPEC countries: constraints and prospects", by N. Abi-Aad, Petroleum Review, March 1991.

2. Non-OPEC oil exporting developing countries

39. The share of world oil production of 19 non-OPEC oil exporting developing countries has increased markedly in the past 20 years.

40. Exploration and development activities in these oil exporting developing countries have been on the rise during the second half of the 1980s. Since 1986 licensed acreage increased by 80 per cent and seismic activity by 71 per cent. However, exploration and development drilling has remained static (see table 7).

41. Exploratory and development well completions have increased substantially in China since 1987 when such information and data were first made available. In 1990, combined total well completions in China were estimated at 7,627 wells, by far the largest number of wells drilled in any developing country. China has opened discussions with foreign companies covering participation in exploration and development in the Xinjiang Region in the far western part of the country, a significant development, as previously foreign participation was limited mainly to offshore activities. The Tarim, Turpan and Junggar basins in the Region are expected to provide significant new reserves for the next century. Several discoveries have been announced in the Tarim basin and an oil discovery was made in the Turpan basin in early 1991.

42. Oil output from Malaysia has been increasing substantially, having risen by about 138 per cent over the last decade. Peak production at the present time can be as high as 650,000 b/d, as demonstrated in 1990 when output was raised to meet the shortfall caused by the Persian Gulf crisis.

43. The Syrian Arab Republic has also made considerable gains in oil output, which has increased continuously in the past decade.

44. Mexico, despite its substantial proved reserves, had been unable in recent years to expand production because of deep indebtedness and lack of foreign exchange. This was at the time of resumption of economic growth and consequent increases in domestic oil demand. It has been reported that Pemex, the national oil company of Mexico with exclusive operations in the country, was able to invest only about US$ 1 billion annually during the late 1980s as compared with US$ 6 billion in 1981. In 1991 Pemex secured a US$ 1.3 billion loan guarantee from the Export-Import Bank of the United States to call in companies from the United States for four big new exploration projects. Pemex was ultimately looking to secure as much as US$ 5.8 billion in guarantees for 16 projects from the same source. Similar arrangements with 25 other national export-import banks were contemplated. 10/

Table 7. Exploration and development indicators in non-OPEC oil exporting developing countries, 1982-1990

Year	Licensed area (thousand sq km)	Seismic activity (line-km)	Exploratory drilling (number of wells)	Development drilling (number of wells)
1982	1 324	146 402	455	1 485
1983	1 222	121 461	369	1 310
1984	1 222	111 368	381	1 389
1985	1 106	127 528	406	1 128
1986	1 046	111 693	350	1 039
1987	1 330	112 314	354 (1 525) a/	850 (5 706) a/
1988	1 523	157 584	352 (1 642) a/	954 (5 809) a/
1989	1 716	230 481	339 (1 665) a/	884 (5 860) a/
1990	1 872	191 028	370 (1 697) a/	750 (5 930) a/

Source: World Petroleum Trends 1991, Petroconsultants (United Kingdom) Ltd.

a/ Figures in parentheses are exploratory and concern development wells completed in China, which data were not available prior to 1987. These data are presented separately to avoid an anomalous increase in the number of wells completed.

45. Viet Nam, a recent entry into the ranks of oil exporters, has made substantial gains in its oil output, with an average of about 65,000 b/d in 1991. Production is from offshore fields operated by Vietsovpetro, the only company producing oil currently. Production is expected to reach 120,000 b/d by 1995. Many foreign oil companies, including national oil companies from developing countries, Petronas of Malaysia, Pertamina of Indonesia and so on, have expressed interest in the offshore areas. Significant increases in Viet Nam's production capacity are to be expected in the near future.

46. There has been a wide degree of variation in the replacement of reserves in the last few years among the major non-OPEC oil exporting developing countries. The greatest successes were registered in the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen, where exploration intensity has been very high recently. Less successful efforts have been registered in Angola, Egypt and Malaysia.

3. Energy-deficient developing countries

47. Other than the 32 oil exporting developing countries - 13 OPEC member countries and 19 non-OPEC oil exporting countries - the remainder of the developing countries and territories, over 100 of them, are net importers of oil. The estimated total import of oil of the energy-deficient developing countries was about 1.7 billion barrels in 1990 (4.5 mb/d), and by far the largest part of the supply was from OPEC Persian Gulf countries.

48. Of this large number of energy-deficient developing countries only 19 have any oil production capacity, ranging in size from world class producers to producers of a few hundred barrels a day or less. The share of total world oil production of this group of oil producing/importing developing countries was about 3.5 per cent in 1991, having retained this share more or less since 1985.

49. Among the large group of non-oil producing developing countries, only 20 had any petroleum exploration activities in recent years.

(a) Oil producing/importing developing countries

50. The total production of this group of oil producing/importing developing countries increased by about 140 per cent since 1970 and reached a level of about 0.764 billion barrels (2.09 mb/d) in 1991. However, almost all of this gain was attributable to the three largest producers, Argentina, Brazil and India. In 1991, production from these three countries, 0.646 billion barrels (1.77 mb/d), amounted to about 85 per cent of the total production of the group of oil producing/importing countries.

51. As shown in table 8, seismic activity has increased considerably in these countries since 1985. However, both exploration and development drilling has declined, mainly because of financing difficulties, especially in Brazil and India.

Table 8. Exploration and development indicators in oil producing/importing developing countries, 1982-1990

Year	Licensed area (thousand sq km)	Seismic activity (line-km)	Exploratory drilling (number of wells)	Development drilling (number of wells)
1982	3 397	196 873	705	1 748
1983	3 077	169 092	823	2 002
1984	3 869	168 786	699	2 115
1985	3 543	171 239	712	2 448
1986	3 578	194 852	570	2 270
1987	3 268	250 682	594	2 327
1988	2 804	297 403	703	2 173
1989	3 346	295 696	646	1 898
1990	4 457	261 608	648	1 627

Source: World Petroleum Trends, 1991, Petroconsultants (United Kingdom) Ltd.

52. Oil production in India, after showing steady gains during the past decade, declined by 4.7 per cent in 1991. This decline was due more to ageing equipment and poor storage and transport facilities than to constraints in production capacity. India's oil output is expected to increase to about 870,000 b/d by the end of fiscal year 1995/96. However, India's oil consumption is expected to reach 1.73 mb/d by then. 11/ In 1990, oil imports cost about US$ 5.5 billion, or about a third of India's foreign exchange outlay. In order to offset the rise in oil import volume, India has to accelerate expansion of its domestic production capacity and to that end plans are being made to intensify exploration and development activities and to extend the search to deepwater, difficult and remote areas with increased foreign participation.

53. In Argentina, the oil and gas industry, particularly the upstream sector, has been deregulated. A large number of the state oil company fields have been privatized, including producing fields with significant proved reserves. It is estimated that 40 per cent of Argentina's oil industry is now in private hands. Much of the properties sold are under-explored and/or underdeveloped and thus there is high potential for increased exploration and production spending. Furthermore, under draft legislation that is being submitted for congressional approval, the state oil company itself will be partially privatized. Oil production in Argentina has increased continuously over the past five to six years. In 1991 total output was about 0.178 billion barrels

(487,300 b/d), which was, however, still below the level of 0.185 billion barrels (505,600 b/d) in 1980. Yet in 1990 Argentina became a net exporter of oil.

54. Oil production in Brazil had increased annually since 1980, having reached a historically high level of about 0.232 billion barrels in 1991 (635,800 b/d). The national oil company, Petrobras, an acknowledged leader in deepwater technology, brought onstream part of the giant Marlin deepwater field in 1991. In 1991, exploration risk contracts came to an end and Petrobras once again has sole responsibility for exploration and production activities in Brazil.

55. Pakistan, Thailand and Turkey also registered substantial gains in their outputs in 1991. Pakistan's output of about 69,500 b/d in 1991 represented a gain of about 16 per cent over the previous year and Thailand's average daily production in 1991 increased 13.7 per cent to about 46,600 b/d and a significant gain of about 24 per cent was registered in Turkey's oil output in 1991 for a daily average of 86,700 b/d.

56. Pakistan continues to attach very high priority to the development of its energy sector, particularly oil and gas exploration and development to reduce oil imports. Recently, Pakistan has negotiated loans and co-financing arrangements with the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank for development of oil and gas fields and the related infrastructure. In Turkey, a new exploration programme in the Black Sea has started and the development of oilfields in the southeastern part of the country discovered in 1989 could lead to further additions to its production capacity. In Thailand, new concessions, both on land and offshore, continue to be opened for exploration and development. Meanwhile, a number of oil companies have applied for permission to start production from their recent onshore discoveries that would lead to a significant increase in total oil output.

57. In most of the other countries of this group, concessions are being awarded increasingly to foreign oil companies and in a number of those countries either discoveries or encouraging oil and gas shows have prompted an increase in exploration activity. 12/

(b) Non-oil producing developing countries

58. Exploration activity in this group of countries continued at a comparatively low level, other than in Papua New Guinea where oil production and export are expected to start during the latter half of 1992.

59. As shown in table 9, licensed acreage and seismic activity continued to decline in the past few years and the trend is likely to continue. The sudden increase in exploratory drilling completions in 1989 and 1990 was attributable in the main to the high number of wells completed in Papua New Guinea, where exploration intensity has been at high levels.

Table 9. Exploration and development indicators in non-oil producing developing countries, 1982-1990

Year	Licensed area (thousand sq km)	Seismic activity (line-km)	Exploratory drilling (number of wells)	Development drilling (number of wells)
1982	2 278	41 239	44	0
1983	1 809	50 402	33	0
1984	2 057	33 095	23	4 a/
1985	1 986	24 784	34	13 b/
1986	1 842	30 148	18	24 b/
1987	1 977	41 032	13	0
1988	1 844	24 032	23	0
1989	1 873	20 901	41	1 c/
1990	1 611	21 887	38	2 c/

Source: World Petroleum Trends 1991, Petroconsultants (United Kingdom) Ltd.

a/ Development wells completed in the Sudan, although no production was scheduled.

b/ Development wells completed in Yemen, which became an oil exporter in 1987.

c/ Development wells completed in Mozambique, although no production was scheduled.

B. Natural gas

60. World recoverable reserves of natural gas, in the long term, are of an equal magnitude to oil reserves and it is generally believed that much more gas will be found as exploration for it becomes as profitable as it is for oil. Proved recoverable reserves of natural gas are estimated at 112 trillion cubic metres, or 734 billion barrels of oil equivalent.

61. A growing number of developing countries have proved gas reserves that have not been developed, especially in Africa. Others, as in the Middle East, have barely begun to exploit their considerable reserves. Many developing countries face major obstacles in developing their gas reserves because of lack of markets and/or requirements for heavy front-end investments in the necessary infrastructure.

62. The magnitude of natural gas reserves has risen steadily during the past two decades, as shown in figure 7. This growth is particularly marked in the Commonwealth of Independent States and the Middle East; these two regions account for two thirds of the world natural gas reserves. Almost 37 per cent of the total proved recoverable reserves of natural gas in the world is located in the Commonwealth of Independent States, primarily in Russia, with about 41 trillion cubic metres. The Commonwealth of Independent States continues to lead in production, consumption and export of natural gas and it is unlikely to reach its peak until well into the next century. Among the developing countries, the Islamic Republic of Iran has the largest proved reserves of natural gas, at about 13.8 trillion cubic metres, or 12.5 per cent of the world's total. The Islamic Republic of Iran has resumed its export of gas to the Commonwealth of Independent States and has been exploring the possibility of pipeline exports to Central Europe via Turkey and to Asia through Pakistan. Gas production in the Islamic Republic will increase significantly with the rise in domestic consumption as a huge gasification programme is under way. Domestic pipelines have been laid and a gas processing plant with a rated capacity of 85 billion cubic metres a year has been inaugurated.

63. In Africa, Algeria has embarked on a renovation and expansion of its gas production facilities, including natural gas liquefaction, and has directed the main thrust of its marketing to the western pipeline to Spain via Morocco and Gibraltar, while increasing the capacity of the Trans Med pipeline to Italy to 16 billion cubic metres a year. Elsewhere in Africa, Nigeria has begun building industrial and domestic markets, having started construction of a pipeline from the fields in the delta to Lagos, towards a target market of 15 billion cubic metres a year. A major liquefied natural gas (LNG) project for export to Europe is under consideration. Many of the central and southern African countries have natural gas reserves that are not being exploited as yet, although small projects involving use of natural gas are being implemented.

Figure 7. World proved natural gas reserves

(At year end)



	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990
Central Europe and Commonwealth of Independent States	9.89	23.74	26.21	41.93	43.77
Africa	5.55	8.96	5.89	5.24	7.47
Middle East	6.58	18.83	20.72	24.34	34.33
Asia and the Pacific	1.89	3.25	3.59	4.65	6.96
Western Europe	4.13	5.63	3.81	5.79	5.37
Latin America	4.66	2.81	4.06	5.18	6.54
North America	9.12	8.11	7.86	8.11	7.26

North America · Latin America · Western Europe · Asia and the Pacific · Middle East · Africa · Central Europe and Commonwealth of Independent States

Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Development, based on the Oil and Gas Journal Energy Database.

64. In the Asia and Pacific region, natural gas production continues to rise, especially from offshore fields in Brunei Darussalam, India, Indonesia, Malaysia and from Australia's North-West Shelf. Gas is marketed mainly as LNG rather than pipeline gas; LNG has a virtual monopoly of the trade in the region, with Japan as the world's largest LNG consumer. Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei Darussalam are the leading suppliers of LNG in the region, to be joined by Australia's North-West Shelf, and there is more than sufficient capacity in those countries to meet considerable increases in LNG demand. A trans-ASEAN (Association of South-East Asian Nations) pipeline, connecting Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines, linking the five countries into a single gas grid capable of transporting up to 20 billion cubic metres of gas a year, is being studied.

65. In Latin America, several countries have increased their natural gas reserves substantially and production has increased by 43 per cent during the past decade with significant gains in production in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia and Mexico. In a number of countries a large part of the gas was re-injected for reservoir pressure maintenance.

66. In Argentina the State-owned Gas del Estado (GDE) is being privatized and contract negotiations and transfer of business units could be complete by the end of 1992. The natural gas pipeline system consists of 7,900 miles of main line delivering 67.9 million cubic metres (2.4 billion cubic feet) a day.

67. In Venezuela, three international companies will be forming a consortium with Lagoven, a subsidiary of Petroleos de Venezuela, the national oil company, to develop the natural gas resources on the Paria peninsula on the north-western coast. The project is expected to involve an overall investment of around US$ 3 billion for export of 4.4 million tons of LNG annually beginning in 1996.

68. The United States of America and the Commonwealth of Independent States are the main natural gas producers in the world. While the production in the United States has increased during the past 20 years, reserves replacement has lagged significantly, as shown in figures 7 and 8. During the same period, in the Commonwealth of Independent States, gas production has more than tripled and the proved reserves increased by more than fourfold.

69. Worldwide, natural gas production has more than doubled since 1970 and new discoveries and increased estimates of existing reserves continued to outpace production, leaving total world reserves at the end of 1990 at 112 trillion cubic metres.

70. As shown in figure 9, gas consumption has increased steadily in all areas over the past two decades and currently natural gas provides about 24 per cent of all commercial energy. Gas utilization includes direct supply as fuel, electricity power generation and chemical feedstock for ammonia, methanol and petrochemicals.

Figure 8. World natural gas production



	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990
Central Europe and Commonwealth of Independent States	284.03	408.11	442.21	622.82	744.99
Africa	2.22	7.61	26.02	41.29	71.04
Middle East	14.32	24.66	24.68	57.63	94.31
Asia and the Pacific	9.86	21.18	65.52	78.87	142.21
Western Europe	51.85	109.42	178.69	182.72	184.23
Latin America	21.57	28.57	59.41	74.73	85.22
North America	428.05	418.75	612.07	501.11	551.86

North America · Latin America · Western Europe · Asia and the Pacific · Middle East · Africa · Central Europe and Commonwealth of Independent States

Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Development, based on the Energy Statistics Yearbook, various issues.

Figure 9. World natural gas consumption



Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Development, based on the Energy Statistics Yearbook, various issues.

71. A new phase of natural gas utilization is materializing as technical progress is making it economically available as a transport fuel with comparatively less environmental impacts. Motor vehicles generate more pollution than any other single human activity and an ever-expanding number of motor vehicles will exacerbate global and local environmental problems. A mitigative option will be the use of an alternative fuel. Compressed natural gas (CNG) and methanol produced from natural gas are technically viable alternatives and are being introduced experimentally in various markets.

C. Coal

72. Coal is the world's most widely available fossil energy source, with proved recoverable reserves of about 1,075 billion metric tons (bmt) of hard coal (bituminous, including anthracite), 130 bmt of sub-bituminous coal and 391 bmt of lignite, for a total of about 1,596 bmt. 13/ At the present world-wide rate of consumption and with existing technology, and even if consumption should increase substantially, the economically recoverable reserves of coal would last several hundred years.

73. Being the most abundant and widely dispersed fossil fuel and currently the second most important source with which the world meets its energy needs, coal will increase in both absolute and relative importance. However, some 75 per cent of total proved recoverable reserves of hard coal occur in just three countries, China (610 bmt), the United States (113 bmt) and the Commonwealth of Independent States (104 bmt). At present these countries produce about two thirds of the world's hard coal. Also, in the case of lignite, some 60 per cent of the proved recoverable reserves are concentrated in the same three countries. Among the developing countries other than China, the distribution of the proved recoverable reserves is again concentrated in a few of the countries, about 50 per cent in India alone.

74. Some 50 developing countries have identified coal resources and 32 of these countries have some production. However, a very large part of the production comes from a few of the developing countries: China, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, India, Republic of Korea and Turkey. As shown in figure 10, total mine production of hard coal of the developing countries in 1990 was about 1,229.3 million metric tons, a share of about 33.8 per cent of the world total coal production of 3,639.5 million tons.

75. Most of the incremental production is expected from the traditional major producers, China, the United States, the Commonwealth of Independent States, South Africa, Australia, Canada, India and Poland. In view of the anticipated substantial increase in energy demand in the developing countries, other smaller producer countries will also play a role. However, there is considerable uncertainty as to the level of demand and production capacities in the developing countries. Large capital investments in extractive, consuming and transport facilities will be required for this purpose.

Figure 10. World hard coal production



	1970	1980	1985	1990
Commonwealth of Independent States	432.72	492.92	494.41	543.01
Africa	5.11	5.11	4.76	6.17
China	354.01	596.01	872.28	1,060.01
Asia and the Pacific	116.41	194.02	243.88	289.29
Europe	611.55	642.56	745.68	784.13
Latin America	8.41	17.68	28.39	37.79
North America	558.43	730.56	770.23	899.11

North America Latin America Western Europe Asia and the Pacific
China Africa Commonwealth of Independent States

Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Development, based on the Energy Statistics Yearbook, various issues.

D. Electric power

76. World-wide electricity consumption increased to 11,753 terawatt hours (TWH) in 1990, a gain of about 2.5 per cent over 1989, a growth rate lower than the average annual rate of 3.9 per cent for 1980-1990. In the developing countries as a group, despite great differences among them, electricity consumption has grown much faster than in the developed market economies, the Central European countries and the Commonwealth of Independent States. The rate of growth in the developing countries averaged over 10 per cent annually in the period, as shown in figure 11, from a total consumption of about 1,223 TWH in 1980 to about 2,661 TWH in 1990. 14/

77. Despite the high annual growth rate mentioned above, the per capita electricity consumption of the developing countries remains very low compared with the developed market economies, as shown in figure 12.

78. There is a constant and critical need to install new electricity generation capacity in the developing countries, not only because of the continuing high growth in demand, but also because of the imperative to replace output from ageing and inefficient power plants. At the current rate of demand growth the developing countries will require a near doubling of installed capacity, from about 590.2 gigawatts in 1990, by the year 2000. This would require an investment of over US$ 1 trillion (in 1989 dollars). 15/ Furthermore, fuel supply, transportation and other infrastructure investments will require considerable additional outlays annually.

79. In the developing countries fossil fuels continue to be the dominant primary energy source for electricity generation, as shown in figure 13, having steadily increased from 775 TWH in 1980 to 1,632 TWH in 1990, with their share of total electricity generated increasing from 61.3 per cent in 1980 to 65.8 per cent in 1990. Hydropower has made significant gains, especially in a number of the developing countries, having increased by 60 per cent during 1980-1990.

Figure 11. Electricity consumption: average annual growth rate, 1980-1990



Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Development, based on the Energy Statistics Yearbook, various issues, and United Nations World Population Chart 1990 (revised).

Figure 12. World electricity consumption, 1990



Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Development, based on the Energy Statistics Yearbook, various issues, and the World Development Report, 1991, the World Bank.

Figure 13. Electricity generation by fuel source in the developing countries



Geothermal	0.3	3.3	12
Nuclear	2.4	17	105
Hydro	285	457	730
Thermal	578	756	1,652

Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Development, based on the Energy Statistics Yearbook, various issues.

IV. FINANCIAL REQUIREMENTS AND INVESTMENTS

80. In view of the expected growth in energy production and consumption in the developing world during the 1990s investment requirements will be considerable. For oil production alone, in the member countries of OPEC it has been estimated that US$ 120 billion will be needed by the year 2000. 16/ Another estimate of investment requirements for the oil industry as a whole has been put as high as US$ 1,020 billion, of which US$ 250 billion is for exploration and development, US$ 250 billion for refining, US$ 180 billion for ocean transportation and pipelines, and US$ 340 billion for storage, distribution and marketing. 17/

81. In comparison much more investment will be needed for electric power. As stated previously, about US$ 1 trillion will be needed in the developing countries alone for electric power generating plants. According to a recent study by the World Bank in energy-deficient developing countries and based on plans for electricity capacity expansion from 236,718 MW in 1989 to 442,907 MW in 1999, cumulative capital investments are estimated at US$ 448.6 billion, of which US$ 150 billion would be in foreign exchange. 18/

82. With capital scarcities even in the traditionally capital surplus oil exporting developing countries it is doubtful that the required petroleum investment will be made without new arrangements between host countries and transnational oil corporations. In oil importing developing countries the problem is likely to be even more pronounced, particularly in exploration, since more countries, including the new republics of the former Soviet Union, will be competing for risk capital. Under these circumstances it becomes even more urgent to consider special and expanded assistance programmes by the international community.

V. CONCLUSION

83. The current situation of surplus energy capacities may provide a false sense of energy supply security. A resumption of economic growth, particularly in the developing world, could lead to yet another energy crisis, which can be prevented if precautionary measures are taken by the international community. Such measures have already been initiated in the context of the Ministerial Seminar of Petroleum Producers and Consumers and the European Energy Charter. 19/

84. In this context the Secretary-General wishes to note that the General Assembly in its resolution 45/209 welcomed the outline of a programme of action for the acceleration of energy exploration and development in the developing countries contained in his report (A/45/274-E/1990/73 and Corr.1) and stressed the need for comprehensive national, bilateral and multilateral measures, particularly with regard to financing, investment and technology, as well as training of national technical personnel, to accelerate the exploration and development of energy resources in developing countries, including new and renewable sources of energy.

85. As analysed in the current and previous reports of the Secretary-General on this subject, very few of the above objectives, which have been endorsed repeatedly by the General Assembly during the past 10 years, have been achieved. With a view to mobilizing the international community to increase efforts for comprehensive national, bilateral and multilateral measures to accelerate the exploration and development of energy resources in developing countries, it is recommended that the Assembly consider the preparation of an expanded programme of action in this regard.

Notes

1/ United Nations press release SG/SM/1218, 1 July 1991.

2/ World Economic Survey 1991, (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.91.II.C.1), table V.1, p. 99.

3/ Ibid.

4/ For more information on the contribution of new and renewable sources of energy to the world energy balance, see (a) the report of the Intergovernmental Group of Experts on New and Renewable Sources of Energy (A/AC.218/1992/9); (b) the report of the Secretary-General on solar energy: a strategy in support of environment and development (A/AC.218/1992/5); and (c) the report of the Committee on the Development and Utilization of New and Renewable Sources of Energy, Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 36 (A/47/36).

5/ The OPEC Persian Gulf States, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar, together hold reserves of about 647.5 billion barrels, against a world total of about 999.1 billion barrels.

6/ All crude oil production, trade and consumption data are from the Energy Statistics Yearbook (United Nations publication), various issues, and Oil and Gas Journal, various last issues of the year containing the "World Prodution Report".

7/ The number of oil fields mentioned is based on the report entitled "Size and distribution of known and undiscovered petroleum resources in the world, with an estimate of future exploration", by Marcello Colitti, OPEC Review, vol. 5, No. 3, 1981.

8/ World Economic Survey 1990 and 1991 (United Nations publication, Sales Nos. E.90.II.C.1 and E.91.II.C.1), chap. V.

9/ Petroleum Review, March 1991, p. 125.

10/ "Mexico President Opens its Oil Industry", The New York Times, 25 September 1991, p. D1.

Notes (continued)

11/ Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, 6 January 1992.

12/ World Oil, August 1991.

13/ World Energy Conference 1989, "Survey of Energy Resources".

14/ All electricity production and consumption data in the section are based on the Energy Statistics Yearbook (United Nations publication), various issues.

15/ See "Report on the Stockholm Initiative on Energy, Environment and Sustainable Development (SEED): Strategies for Implementing Power Sector Efficiency, Stockholm, 13-15 November 1991", key issues papers.

16/ Dr. Subroto, Secretary-General, Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, has stated at several forums that some US$ 120 billion will be required in OPEC countries for oil exploration and development during the present decade.

17/ Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, 13 January 1992, p. 7. See "Oil industry investment needs in the 1990s: Will US$ 1 trillion be enough? Will it be available?", by Walter L. Newton.

18/ "Capital Expenditures for Electric Power in Developing Countries in the 1990s", World Bank, Energy and Industry Working Paper, Energy Series Paper 21, February 1990.

19/ See the Declaration on International Economic Cooperation, in particular the Revitalization of Economic Growth and Development of the Developing Countries, contained in the annex to General Assembly resolution S-18/3 of 1 May 1990; the International Development Strategy for the Fourth United Nations Development Decade annexed to resolution 45/199 of 21 December 1990; and resolutions 40/208 of 17 December 1985, 43/193 of 20 December 1988 and 45/209 of 21 December 1990 on the development of the energy resources of developing countries.

UNITED
NATIONS

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General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/47/203
11 May 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Forty-seventh session
Item 80 of the preliminary list*

REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT

Letter dated 8 May 1992 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Malaysia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of the Kuala Lumpur Declaration on Environment and Development, issued by the Second Ministerial Conference of Developing Countries on Environment and Development, which was held at Kuala Lumpur from 26 to 29 April 1992 (see annex).

I should be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under item 80 of the preliminary list and brought to the attention of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development.

(Signed) M. REDZUAN Kushairi
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

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ANNEX

Second Ministerial Conference of Developing Countries on Environment and Development

KUALA LUMPUR DECLARATION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT

We, the Ministers from 55 developing countries a/ met at Kuala Lumpur, at the invitation of the Government of Malaysia, from 26 to 29 April 1992, at the Second Ministerial Conference of Developing Countries on Environment and Development. The Kuala Lumpur Conference which had its initiation in New Delhi, India, in April 1990, is a follow-up to the First Ministerial Conference held in Beijing in June 1991. The Kuala Lumpur Conference was also attended by observers b/ from 11 developed countries, 10 international organizations and 9 non-governmental organizations.

1. We exchanged views on the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) process, which started in 1989 with United Nations General Assembly resolution 44/228, in the light of the results of the Fourth Substantive Session of the Preparatory Committee of UNCED held in New York from 2 March to 3 April 1992. To that effect, we reaffirm the will and the determination of our Governments to ensure that the Rio Conference fully and clearly achieves in concrete terms the provisions contained in the relevant General Assembly resolutions notably resolution 44/228. In this context, the discussions centered on efforts to address important outstanding issues, with a view to finding solutions for them at UNCED scheduled at Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 3-14 June 1992.

2. While noting that progress was made in a number of areas at the Fourth Substantive Session of the Preparatory Committee, we express our serious concern at the lack of progress on a few key issues, particularly financial resources and mechanisms.

3. UNCED is of historic importance and provides the occasion at the highest levels of government to address environment and development in an integrated, comprehensive and balanced manner for the benefit of both present and future generations. We call for a new global partnership based on respect for sovereignty and the principles of equity and equality among States for the achievement of sustainable development, taking into account the main responsibility of developed countries for the deterioration of the environment, and the need for sustained economic growth and development of developing countries.

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a/ Appendix 1 - list of developing countries participating in the above Conference.

b/ Appendix 2 - list of observers participating in the above Conference.

4. Development is a fundamental right of all peoples and countries. An environmentally sound planet should correspond to a socially and economically just world. An environmentally sound development, and the creation of a supportive international economic environment to achieve this objective, including transfer of new and additional financial resources to developing countries, through distinct and specific mechanisms which are transparent, accountable and with equal representation in decision-making, and modalities for transfer of technology, must be at the centre of the international agenda. In this regard, recognizing the importance of international trade to all countries and the need for far-reaching reforms in international economic relations, we call on the developed countries to ensure without further delay a balanced, meaningful and satisfactory conclusion of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. We further emphasize that developed countries should not attempt to impose unilateral restrictions on international trade, in particular, on natural resource-based and other related products on environmental grounds.

5. We further underline, in the context of attaining sustainable development, the need for the urgent conclusion and implementation of internationally supported measures to enhance and stabilize commodity prices, including commodity diversification, processing and development.

6. We reiterate that for the new global partnership to be meaningful developing countries must have the resources to participate effectively. We also underline the urgent need to eradicate poverty and to guarantee sustained growth in both economic and environmental terms.

7. We stress that sustainable development makes it incumbent on developed countries to take major steps to transform their production, consumption and distribution patterns towards environmentally sound development. For the developing countries, sustainable development implies the right to development with due regard to the ecological processes. In order for the developing countries to achieve sustainable development, developed countries should adhere to a new concept of global partnership.

8. On the basis of the foregoing, and reaffirming the principles and objectives of the First Ministerial Conference of Developing Countries on Environment and Development held at Beijing, we agree on the following positions on the core issues of special importance to developing countries to be taken up at the Rio Conference:

Rio Declaration on Environment and Development

9. We note the progress made at the Fourth Substantive Session of the Preparatory Committee in regard to the elaboration of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, as reflected in the Chairman's Draft Text transmitted for further consideration and finalization at the Rio Conference. Recalling the reservations made, including those by developing countries, we agree that steps need to be taken to further develop the text in line with General Assembly resolution 44/228.

Agenda 21

10. We note the progress made at the Fourth Substantive Session of the Preparatory Committee Meeting in the identification of specific objectives, programmes and activities of Agenda 21 in a number of areas, including the recognition of the need for international efforts to address the serious problem of desertification and drought. We further reaffirm our willingness to continue participating in a constructive attitude in the issues yet to be resolved. We are also of the view that the programmes must support national priorities, must form an integrated package, and should not be used as a new form of conditionality in access to development support or any attempts to review national policies or strategies. We believe that agreement on the implementation of Agenda 21 programmes will depend on the availability of adequate, new and additional financial resources, and the transfer of technology to developing countries on preferential and concessional terms.

Financial resources

11. We reaffirm the position which was presented by the Group of 77 and China at the Fourth Substantive Session of the Preparatory Committee for UNCED.

12. As regards the means of implementation, we are of the view that new and additional funding should be the basis of an evolving partnership leading progressively towards the goal of sustainable development in both developing and developed countries. This funding should be provided in addition to, and separate from, the official development assistance (ODA) target commitments by the developed countries. A specific and separate fund for the implementation of Agenda 21 should be established. Predictability in the flow of funds should be ensured by assessed contributions from developed countries. Developing countries could contribute on a voluntary basis. The governance of the fund should include the following criteria:

(a) It should be transparent;

(b) It should be democratic in nature, with an equal voice for all parties in setting project eligibility criteria, project selection, and the authority to release funds, enabling an equitable balance between developed and developing countries;

(c) It should provide access and disbursement to all developing countries without any conditionality; and

(d) It should provide for funding of activities according to the priorities and needs of the developing countries, taking into account Agenda 21.

All possibilities can be explored in regard to location or locations of the fund and its administrative and operational activities in the light of the above criteria. In addition, existing mechanisms governed by the criteria defined above, could also be utilized as appropriate, in order to optimize

provision of substantial grants or concessionary resources for the implementation of Agenda 21. In the follow-up after UNCED, there should be provisions for the effective monitoring of the financing of Agenda 21 and the mechanisms utilized for that purpose.

13. We welcome the initiative and note the Tokyo Declaration on Financing Global Environment and Development.

Transfer of technology

14. We recognize the progress made at the Fourth Substantive Session of the Preparatory Committee Meeting on this subject and strongly stress the need for assured access to, and transfer of technology on, preferential and concessional terms to developing countries, taking into consideration that Intellectual Property Rights should not hinder the transfer of technology to developing countries. We further stress that the concept of transfer of technology should not be diluted by referring to it as technology cooperation. We emphasize that modalities should be immediately set up for the transfer of technology, including state-of-the-art technologies, to developing countries consistent with the relevant provisions of General Assembly resolution 44/228.

Statement of principles on forests

15. We emphasize that forest ecosystems and resources are part of the national patrimony to be managed, conserved and developed by each country in accordance with its national plans and priorities in the exercise of its sovereign rights.

16. We call on all countries to give full support to the finalization of a Non-Legally-binding Authoritative Statement of Principles on the Management, Conservation and Development of All Types of Forests and its adoption at the Rio Conference. Considering that the Statement of Principles would provide an adequate and sound basis for the greening of the world, including through reforestation, afforestation, regeneration and sustainable use of forest resources, the negotiations of a legally binding instrument on forest would not be required.

17. We also call on the developed countries to substantially increase their forest cover and to avoid unilateral measures in the name of environmental protection, that constitute arbitrary or discriminatory action such as bans and restrictions on international trade of forest and forest-related products from the developing countries.

Institutions

18. We stress the necessity for an early decision on an intergovernmental institutional arrangement for follow-up of Agenda 21 and other decisions of UNCED, in accordance with agreed sections of document A/CONF.151/PC/WG.III/L.31/Rev.1 and further agreement to be achieved at the

Rio Conference. The Rio Conference could also recommend to the General Assembly provisions for financial and other means in the interim period between the Rio Conference and the forty-seventh United Nations General Assembly. In addition, we agree that national and regional institutions should be strengthened in order to promote sustainable development.

Proposed Conventions on Climate Change and Biological Diversity

19. We note the current stage of negotiations pertaining to the Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Convention on Biological Diversity, and call for their early conclusion.

Framework Convention on Climate Change

20. We express deep concern at the lack of progress in the negotiations for the Framework Convention on Climate Change. In this regard, and in accordance with United Nations General Assembly resolution 46/169, we urge the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee to expedite and successfully complete the negotiations as soon as possible and to adopt the Framework Convention on Climate Change, containing appropriate commitments and any related legal instruments as may be agreed upon, in time for it to be opened for signature during UNCED. We stress the importance of these negotiations which should seriously address the adverse impact of climate change on developing countries including adaptation and mitigation measures. This is especially relevant to small island States; States with low-lying coastal areas, which are vulnerable to climate change and its consequential sealevel rise; disaster-prone developing countries; and countries liable to drought and desertification.

21. We urge the developed countries to undertake meaningful and specific commitments on the stabilization and reduction of emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases.

22. We further stress that developed countries should make commitments for the provision of financial resources and transfer of technology to developing countries to enable them to adapt, mitigate and combat climate change and its adverse effects. We also stress that a fund should be established under this Convention for its implementation.

23. We also express concern on the implications of the Convention to developing countries whose economies are highly dependent on income generated from the production, processing, export, and/or the consumption of fossil fuels and associated energy-intensive products.

24. We reiterate that the implementation mechanisms of the Convention should fully take into account the sovereign rights of each country to determine its national policies, plans and programmes for sustainable development.

Convention on Biological Diversity

25. We note the progress of the negotiations for a Convention on Biological Diversity and reaffirm the sovereign rights of States to use their biological and genetic resources.

26. We underline the need for the Convention to establish mechanisms to give effect to the rights of countries which possess biological and genetic resources in in-situ conditions. In this context, we reiterate that the Convention on Biological Diversity must include legally binding commitments to ensure the link between the access to the genetic material of developing countries and the transfer of biotechnology and research capabilities from developed countries, as well as sharing of commercial profits and products derived from the genetic material.

27. We recognize that developing countries are already taking measures to conserve and use in a sustainable manner their biological resources and stress that those measures should be supported by the developed countries through the provision of financial and other resources.

28. We are of the view that providing for a "Global List of Biogeographic Areas of Global Importance" under the Convention on Biological Diversity is not necessary.

29. We also stress that a fund should be established under this Convention to make it possible for developing countries to fulfil their obligations under the Convention.

South-South cooperation

30. We recognize the need to enhance South-South cooperation on environment and development, by regular consultations at all levels and through exchange of environmentally sound scientific and technological knowledge on mutually acceptable terms, in the interest of accelerating development. We agree that there should be regular consultations at ministerial, scientific and other expert levels to encourage cooperation and monitor the decisions to be taken at the Rio Conference.

APPENDIX 1

List of developing countries attending the Second Ministerial Conference of Developing Countries on Environment and Development, 26 to 29 April 1992

Developing countries

No.	Country
1.	Algeria
2.	Argentina
3.	Bangladesh
4.	Barbados
5.	Benin
6.	Brazil
7.	Brunei Darussalam
8.	Chile
9.	China
10.	Colombia
11.	Côte d'Ivoire
12.	Cuba
13.	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
14.	Egypt
15.	Ethiopia
16.	Fiji
17.	Ghana
18.	Guyana
19.	India
20.	Indonesia
21.	Iran (Islamic Republic of)
22.	Jordan
23.	Kenya
24.	Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
25.	Malaysia
26.	Maldives

No.	Country
27.	Mali
28.	Malta
29.	Mauritania
30.	Mauritius
31.	Mexico
32.	Morocco
33.	Nepal
34.	Nigeria
35.	Oman
36.	Pakistan
37.	Palestine
38.	Papua New Guinea
39.	Peru
40.	Philippines
41.	Republic of Korea
42.	Saudi Arabia
43.	Senegal
44.	Singapore
45.	Sudan
46.	Tanzania
47.	Thailand
48.	Tunisia
49.	Uganda
50.	Vanuatu
51.	Venezuela
52.	Viet Nam
53.	Yugoslavia
54.	Zaire
55.	Zimbabwe

APPENDIX 2

List of Observers attending the Second Ministerial Conference of Developing Countries on Environment and Development, 26 to 29 April 1992

1. Developed countries

No.	Country
1.	Australia
2.	Canada
3.	Germany
4.	France
5.	Japan
6.	Netherlands
7.	Norway
8.	Portugal
9.	Sweden
10.	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
11.	United States of America

2. International organizations

1. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED)
2. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
3. Department of Economic and Social Development (DESD)
4. International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO)
5. United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)
6. European Community (EC)
7. World Meteorological Organization (WMO)
8. ASEAN secretariat
9. International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)
10. Asian Wetland Bureau

3. Other Observers

1. African National Congress (ANC)

4. Non-governmental organizations

1. SUNS
2. Third World Network
3. Research Foundation for Technology and Natural Resources
4. Environmental Protection Society of Malaysia
5. Sahabat Alam Malaysia
6. Federation of Malaysia Consumers' Association
7. Genetic Resources
8. Business Council for Sustainable Development
9. World Wildlife Fund

UNITED
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General Assembly Security Council

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7 May 1992
ENGLISH
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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-seventh session
Items 45 and 99 of the preliminary list*

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-seventh year

QUESTION OF CYPRUS

INFORMATION FROM NON-SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORIES TRANSMITTED UNDER ARTICLE 73 e OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Letter dated 7 May 1992 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit to you extracts from the report of the European Commission of Human Rights, Application No. 8007/77, Cyprus vs. Turkey, that was adopted by the Commission on 4 October 1983. The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe decided on 2 April 1992 to make public the report and its findings (see annex).

I shall be very grateful if the text of the present letter and its annex is circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under items 45 and 99 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Petros EFTYCHIOU
Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the
Permanent Mission of the
Republic of Cyprus to the
United Nations

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ANNEX

COUNCIL OF EUROPE

CONSEIL DE L'EUROPE

EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

Application No. 8007/77

CYPRUS

against

TURKEY

Report of the Commission

(Adopted on 4 October 1983)

STRASBOURG

PART I - GENERAL

Chapter 1 - Application of Arts 28 and 31 of the Convention in the circumstances of the present case

48. The Commission, noting the respondent Government's refusal to participate in the proceedings provided for by Art 28 of the Convention (1), confirms the following observations made at paras 38 to 44 of its Interim Report (cf para 28 above).

"38. The respondent Government, after having taken part, together with the applicant Government, in the Commission's proceedings on the admissibility of the application, refuse to participate in the present proceedings on the merits, particularly on the ground already advanced at the stage of admissibility that the application was not lodged with the Commission by a competent authority of the Republic of Cyprus.

39. The Commission recalls that, as stated in the Preamble, the High Contracting Parties have in the Convention taken 'the first steps for the collective enforcement' of the rights defined in Section I of the Convention and that, under Art 19, they have set up the Commission and the Court for this purpose. A system of collective protection of human rights, as established by the Convention, requires, in order to be effective, the co-operation with the Commission of all High Contracting States concerned in a case. This is reflected in Art 28 para (a) of the Convention, which expressly obliges the parties to an admitted application to 'furnish all necessary facilities' for the Commission's investigation.

40. The Commission cannot accept the respondent Government's statement, that they do not recognise the applicant Government as the Government of Cyprus, as a ground which could absolve Turkey from its obligation to co-operate with the Commission in the present proceedings. The Commission has already stated in its decision on the admissibility that the Convention establishes a system of collective enforcement and that an application brought under Art 24 does not of itself envisage any direct rights or obligations between the High Contracting Parties concerned.

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(1) See above paras 19, 23, 27, 31, 35, 39 and 41 in fine.

41. The respondent Government maintain that Turkey cannot be obliged to recognise the applicant Government as representing the Republic of Cyprus. They have also submitted that Art 28 of the Convention, which governs the procedure on the merits of an admitted application, requires direct contacts between the parties concerned.

42. The Commission observes, firstly, that its decision admitting the present application is conclusive on the Parties and, secondly, that the question of the recognition of the applicant Government by the respondent Government does not arise at the proceedings on the merits. Commission proceedings under Art 28 do not necessitate direct contacts between the parties concerned.

43. The Commission considers further that to accept that a Government may void 'collective enforcement' of the Convention under Art 24, by asserting that they do not recognise the Government of the applicant State, would defeat the purpose of the Convention.

44. The Commission finally notes that the respondent Government, while not recognising the applicant Government as Government of Cyprus, nevertheless participated as a Party concerned, under Art 32, and submitted a memorandum, in the Committee of Ministers' examination of the merits of the two previous applications (N°s 6780/74 and 6950/75) by Cyprus against Turkey. Those proceedings were, like the present one, governed by the Convention."

49. The Commission also confirms its opinion, stated at para 45 of the Interim Report "that, by its refusal to participate in the Commission's examination of the merits of the present application, Turkey has so far failed to respect its obligations under Art 28 of the Convention" and it recalls that it requested the Committee of Ministers "to urge Turkey, as a High Contracting Party to the European Convention on Human Rights, to meet its obligations under this Convention and accordingly to participate in the Commission's examination of the merits of the present application, as required by Art 28" (para 48 of the Interim Report).

50. The Commission notes the Decision adopted by the Committee of Ministers during the 326th meeting of the Ministers' Deputies (24 November to 4 December 1980) in which the Committee, having taken cognizance of the Commission's Interim Report, "Recalls the obligations imposed on all the Contracting Parties by Article 28 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms." (cf para 29 above).

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51. The respondent Government nevertheless did not comply with the Commission's subsequent invitations to file observations and to appear at a hearing (1).

52. The Commission has already stated in the two previous applications by Cyprus against Turkey that a respondent party's failure to co-operate in proceedings under Art 28 does not prevent it from completing, as far as possible, its examination of the application and from making a Report to the Committee of Ministers under Art 31 of the Convention (2). In those applictions the Commission, in the absence of any submissions by the respondent Government on the merits of the complaints, accordingly "proceeded with its establishment of the facts on the basis of the material before it" (3).

53. In the present case the Commission, adopting the same procedure, has again based its Report on the material before it, including the submissions made by the Parties on the admissibility of the application. In this connection it has also considered Annex I to the respondent Government's observations on the admissibility, a document entitled "Observations by Mr R.R. Denktash, President of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus". The Commission's notice of this document does not imply any view on the position of Mr Denktash, other than that his observations, as reproduced therein, are considered as forming part of those of the respondent Government (4).

(1) Cf. supra par. 30, 31, 34, 35, 38, 39 et 41 in fine
(2) Rapport du 10 juillet 1976, par. 55
(3) Ibid. par. 79
(4) Cf. également infra par. 63

Chapter 3 - Responsibility of Turkey under the Convention

63. In its decision on the admissibility of the present application, the Commission, confirming its finding in the previous case, stated that the Turkish armed forces in Cyprus brought any persons or property there "within the jurisdiction" of Turkey, in the sense of Art 1 of the Convention, to the extent that they exercised control over such persons or property. The Commission further observed that Cyprus had since 1974 been prevented from exercising its jurisdiction in the northern part of its territory by the presence there of armed forces of Turkey; that the recognition by Turkey of the Turkish Cypriot administration in that area as "Turkish Federated State of Cyprus" did not, according to the respondent Government's own submissions, affect the continuing existence of the Republic of Cyprus as a single State; and that, consequently, the "Turkish Federated State of Cyprus" could not be regarded as an entity which exercised "jurisdiction", within the meaning of Art 1 of the Convention, over any part of Cyprus. The Commission concluded that Turkey's jurisdiction in the north of the Republic of Cyprus, existing by reason of the presence of her armed forces there which prevented exercise of jurisdiction by the applicant Government, could not be excluded on the ground that jurisdiction in that area was allegedly exercised by the "Turkish Federated State of Cyprus".

64. The Commission does not find it necessary to add anything to its above observations as regards the imputability to Turkey of any particular violation of the Convention by her own armed forces which may be established in Parts II and III of this Report. As to violations of the Convention by acts of the Turkish Cypriot administration the Commission considers that, as submitted by the applicant Government (1), the existence of some kind of civil administration in northern Cyprus does not exclude Turkish responsibility given the degree of control which Turkey has in northern Cyprus. In particular, the Commission is satisfied that fundamental changes of the conditions in northern Cyprus cannot be decided without the express or tacit approval of the Turkish authorities.

65. As in the previous case (2), the Commission finally observes in this connection that the substance of the present application required it to confine its investigation essentially to acts and incidents for which Turkey, as a High Contracting Party, might be held responsible. Alleged violations of the Convention by Cyprus could be taken into account as such only if Turkey or another High Contracting Party had raised them in an application to the Commission under Art 24 of the Convention.

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(1) Verbatim record of the hearing of 7 March 1983, p 32.

(2) Report of 10 July 1976, para 85.

Chapter 4 - Art 15 of the Convention

66. The Commission has in the previous case (1) considered whether there was a basis for applying Art 15 of the Convention:

- with regard to the northern area of Cyprus, and/or

- with regard to provinces of Turkey where Greek Cypriots were detained.

67. The Commission then:

- concluded that it could not, in the absence of some formal and public act of derogation by Turkey, apply Art 15 of the Convention to measures taken by Turkey with regard to persons or property in the north of Cyprus (2);

- considered that certain communications made by Turkey under Art 15 (3) with regard to certain provinces including the Adana region, in which martial law was declared, could not, within the conditions prescribed in Art 15, be extended to cover the treatment of persons brought into Turkey from the northern area of Cyprus. The Commission concluded that it could not apply Art 15 to the treatment by Turkey of Greek Cypriot prisoners brought to and detained in Turkey (3).

68. The Commission confirms these conclusions in the present case.

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(1) Report of 10 July 1976, para 524.

(2) Ibidem para 528.

(3) Ibidem paras 529 - 531.

Chapter 4. - Opinion of the Commission

116. The Commission observes that it has in the present case re-examined the issue of missing persons on the basis of fresh evidence offered by the applicant Government; the verbatim record of the Delegates' hearing of witnesses was communicated to the respondent Government who were, like the applicant Government, given the opportunity of submitting observations on this new evidence (cf paras 38, 39, 95 above). The Commission considers that the factual information now before it concerning the issue of missing persons is more detailed and direct than in the previous applications and thus offers a better basis for the examination of this question.

117. In its evaluation of this evidence the Commission has found it established in three of five cases investigated, and has found sufficient indications in an indefinite number of cases (para 115 above), that Greek Cypriots, who are still missing, were in Turkish custody in 1974. It considers that this creates a presumption of Turkish responsibility for the fate of these persons and notes with concern that no relevant information has been provided by the Turkish authorities.

118. The Commission notes that the families of these missing persons have been without news from them for nearly nine years and that this is due to the respondent Government's failure to account for the fate of these persons in their custody. It finds that the resulting uncertainty has caused severe suffering to these families who are entitled under the Convention to be informed of the situation of their close relatives (1).

119. The wording of Art 5, in particular para (1), second sentence, para (3) first sentence, and para (4), shows in the Commission's view that any deprivation of liberty must be subject to control and that any unaccounted disappearance of a detained person must be considered as a particularly serious violation of this Article, which can also be understood as a guarantee against such disappearances.

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(1) The Commission here refers to Resolution DH (82) 1, adopted by the Committee of Ministers in Applications Nos 8022/77, 8025/77 and 8027/77 - McVeigh and others v. the United Kingdom - on 27 March 1982, in which it was held (at the penultimate paragraph) that there had been a breach of Art 8 of the Convention "insofar as the applicants McVeigh and Evans were prevented from contacting their wives during detention".

120. The evidence before the Commission is limited in time to the situation of missing Greek Cypriots in the second half of 1974, i.e. nine years ago (1). The applicant Government submit (para 72) that a considerable number were seen alive in detention in Turkey more recently, but no evidence has been adduced in support of this allegation.

121. The Commission cannot exclude that missing persons found to have been in Turkish detention in 1974 have died in the meanwhile but, on the material before it, it cannot make any finding as to the circumstances in which such deaths may have occurred.

122. The Commission finds no justification, in the circumstances of the present case, for detaining any of these missing persons. It observes that its statement concerning prisoners of war, at para 313 of its Report in the previous case, related only to initial detention during or immediately following the hostilities, which were terminated on 16 August 1974.

Conclusion

123. The Commission, having found it established in three cases, and having found sufficient indications in an indefinite number of cases, that Greek Cypriots who are still missing were unlawfully deprived of their liberty, in Turkish custody in 1974, noting that Turkey has failed to account for the fate of these persons, concludes by 16 votes against one that Turkey has violated Art 5 of the Convention.

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(1) With the exception of case N° 1410, referred to at para 109 above.

PART III - REMAINING COMPLAINTS

Chapter 1 - Displacement of Persons and Separation of Families

(a) Submissions

(aa) Applicant Government

124. The applicant Government allege(1) that Turkey:

- prevents about 200,000 Greek Cypriots from returning to their homes in the North; and

- forces the remaining Greek Cypriots in the North to leave their homes and to take refuge in the south: between 18 May 1976 and 10 February 1983 "about 7,000 Greek Cypriots were forced to sign applications to leave the occupied area". The Government speak of "inhuman methods used to force the remaining Greek Cypriot inhabitants of the occupied area to leave that area (e.g. restrictions on movement, education and work threats, violence etc.)" and state that, according to the U.N. Secretary-General's Report of 1 December 1982 (S/15502, para 26), the Greek Cypriot population in the occupied area amounted, at that time, to 952 persons; on 10 February 1983 it amounted to 940.

The applicant Government submit that the above facts constitute "continuous violations of Art 8 of the Convention. Furthermore, the methods used to force the remaining Greek Cypriot inhabitants of the occupied area of Cyprus amount to violations of" Arts 3 to 5, 8, 11 and 14 of the Convention and Arts 1 and 2 of Protocol N°1.

125. The applicant Government further allege (2) that systematic colonisation of the occupied area of Cyprus has been effected by the settlement of Turks from mainland Turkey who acquire the status of "Turkish Cypriot citizens". These settlers seized and occupied the houses and lands of the Greek Cypriots, exploited their fields and stole their agricultural produce, and harassed, by various inhuman methods and activities, the remaining Greek Cypriot population in the North, thus forcing them to leave and move to the Government controlled area. The colonisation was carried out in furtherance of the Turkish policy of altering the racial balance of the island and

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(1) Final submissions of 10 February 1983, para 47.

(2) Final submissions paras 57-60.

changing the demographic pattern of Cyprus by converting the occupied area into an exclusively Turkish populated area on a permanent basis. Since the Turkish invasion about 63,000 Turks from the mainland have settled in the occupied area.

The applicant Government submit that this colonisation constitutes continuing violations of Arts 3, 5, 8, 13, 14 and of Art 1 of Protocol N° 1 to the Convention.

126. The applicant Government, quoting reports of the UN Secretary General of 1976-82, finally allege (1) that the above measures of displacement of Greek Cypriots (para 124 above) caused separation of families in a substantial number of cases.

They invoke Art 8 of the Convention and refer to para 211 of the Commission's Report on the two previous applications.

(1) Final submissions para 66.

(b) Opinion of the Commission

130. The Commission recalls that the issue of displacement of persons was examined under Art 8 of the Convention in Part II, Chapter 1, of its Report on Applications N°s. 6780/74 an 6950/75. The Commission then also noted (at paras 92 et seq), when examining the question of displacement of persons, the applicant Government's allegations concerning a compulsory exchange of population and information as to the settlement of Turkish Cypriots and Turkish settlers in the North (para 94).

131. The Commission considered in the previous case (at para 208) "that the prevention of the physical possibility of the return of Greek Cypriot refugees to their homes in the north of Cyprus amounts to an infringement, imputable to Turkey, of their right to respect of their homes" which could not be justified on any ground under para (2) of Art 8. It concluded that, "by the refusal to allow the return of more than 170,000 Greek Cypriot refugees to their homes in the north of Cyprus, Turkey did not act, and was continuing not to act, in conformity with Art 8 of the Convention in all these cases."

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(1) Cf para 53 above.

The Commission further considered (at para 210), with regard to Greek Cypriots transferred to the south under various intercommunal agreements, that the prevention of the physical possibility of the return of these Greek cypriots to their homes in the north of Cyprus generally amounted to an infringement, imputable to Turkey and not justified under para (2), of their right to respect for their homes under para (1) of Art 8. It concluded that, "by the refusal to allow the return to their homes in the north of Cyprus to several thousand Greek Cypriots who had been transferred to the South under intercommunal agareements, Turkey did not act, and was continuing not to act, in conformity with Art 8 of the Convention in all these cases."

132. The Commission finally recalls that it examined the issue of separation of families under the heading "Displacement of persons" in its Report on Applications N°s 6780/74 and 6950/75. It then found:

- that the separation of Greek Cypriot families resulting from measures of displacement imputable to Turkey under the Convention must also be imputed to Turkey. The continued separation of families resulting from Turkey's refusal to allow the return of Greek Cypriot refugees to their family members in the North, the separation of families brought about by expulsions of family members across the demarcation line, or by transfers of members of the same family to different places of detention, must therefore be imputed to Turkey (para 205); and

- that the separation of families brought about by measures of displacement imputable to Turkey were interferences, with the right of the persons concerned to respect for their family life as guaranteed by para (1), which could not be justified on any ground under para (2) of Art 8 (para 211).

The Commission then concluded (at para 211) that, by the separation of Greek Cypriot families brought about by measures of displacement in a substantial number of cases, Turkey had not acted in conformity with her obligations under Art 8 of the Convention.

133. In the present case the Commission, again examining the issue of displaced persons under Art 8 of the Convention, confirms the finding made, at para 168 of its Report on the previous applications, that displaced Greek Cypriots in the South are physically prevented from returning to the northern area as a result of the fact that the demarcation line across Cyprus ("green line" in Nicosia) is sealed off by the Turkish army. This fact of common knowledge is not disputed by the respondent Government (cf para 127 above). /...

134. The Commission finds that the continuation of this situation, since the adoption of its Report on the first two applications on 10 July 1976, must in the circumstances of the present case be considered as an aggravating factor.

135. The Commission concludes, by 13 votes against two with two abstentions that, by her continued refusal to allow over 170,000 Greek Cypriots the return to their homes in the North of Cyprus, Turkey continues to violate Art 8 in all these cases.

136. The Commission further finds that the continued separation of families resulting from Turkey's refusal to allow the return of Greek Cypriots to their family members in the North must in the circumstances of the present case be considered as an aggravating factor.

It concludes, by 14 votes against two and with one abstention, that, in the cases of continued separations of families resulting from Turkey's refusal to allow the return of Greek Cypriots to their family members in the North, Turkey continues to violate Art 8 of the Convention.

(b) Opinion of the Commission

148. As regards the displacement of the overwhelming majority of the Greek Cypriot population from the northern area, where it left behind movable and immovable possessions, and the established fact that these displaced persons are not allowed to return to their homes in the North, and thus to property left there, the Commission refers to its above findings under the heading "Displacement of Persons" (paras 132 et seq).

149. As to immovable property, the Commission further recalls that, in its Report on Applications N°s 6780/74 and 6950/75, it found (at para 472) elements of proof of taking and occupation of houses and land by Turkish Cypriots and Turks from the mainland, both military personnel and civilians. The Commission then observed (at para 473) that about 40,000 Turkish Cypriots originally residing in the South had, from 1974 onwards , moved gradually to the North of the Island, where accommodation had to be found for them. That supported allegations concerning the occupation on a considerable scale of houses and land in the North belonging to Greek Cypriots, and the establishment of an office for housing to regulate the distribution. The Commission therefore accepted the evidence obtained as establishing the taking and occupation of houses and land belonging to Greek Cypriots (para 474). The Commission also found strong indications that Turks from the mainland had settled in the North in houses belonging to Greek Cypriots (para 476) and it found it established that agricultural, commercial and indistrial enterprises were taken out of the hands of Greek Cypriots (para 477) and that hotels were put into operation in the northern area (para 478).

150. As to movable property, the Commission recalls its finding, at para 481 of its Report on Applications N°s 6780/74 and 6950/75, that looting and robbery on an extensive scale, by Turkish troops and Turkish Cypriots have taken place.

151. The Commission finally recalls its finding in Applications N°s 6780/74 and 6950/75 (at para 48 of its Report) that destruction of property had taken place in many cases.

152. The Commission concluded in Applications N°s 6780/74 and 6950/75 (at para 486 of its Report) that there had been deprivation of possessions of Greek Cypriots on a large scale, imputable to Turkey and not necessary for any of the purposes mentioned in Art 1 of Protocol N° 1.

153. In its examination of the complaints concerning interference with possessions in the present case, the Commission notes that, since the adoption of its Report in the previous applications, deprivation of property of Greek Cypriots in the North of the Island has been confirmed by what is referred to by the applicant Government as the "Law to Provide for the Housing and Distribution of Land and Property of Equal Value" of 16 August 1977. There have also been interferences with property rights of some 7,000 Greek Cypriots who since 18 May 1976 (when the Commission terminated its investigation in the first two applications) have moved to the South (cf above para 124 in fine). The Commission observes that the occupation and taking of Greek Cypriot property in the North is not disputed by the respondent Government (cf para 143 above).

154. The Commission is of the opinion that the measure described of 16 August 1977 consolidates the earlier occupation of immovable property and for that reason constitutes a violation of Art 1 of Protocol N° 1. In addition it is not disputed that new takings of movable property occurred after the adoption of the Report of the Commission of 10 July 1976.

155. The Commission concludes, by 13 votes against one and with three abstentions, that Turkey has violated Art 1 of Protocol N° 1.

Chapter 3. - Absence of Remedies

(a) Submissions

156. The applicant Government submit (1) that, throughout the relevant period, there was no effective relevant remedy in the Turkish courts or before any authority in the Turkish occupied area of Cyprus or in Turkey in respect of any of the violations complained of. According to the so-called "Constitution of the TFSC" practically all the human rights of the Greek Cypriots that have been violated are not even recognised.

The applicant Government invoke Arts 6 and 13 of the Convention.

157. The respondent Government, at Annex I (para 73) to their observations on the admissibility (2), submitted that all cases of offences committed against Greek Cypriots living in the North of Cyprus and their properties, which come to the knowledge of the authorities of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, are investigated and referred to courts. Severe sentences were imposed on a number of persons convicted for serious criminal offences committed during 1976 on Greek Cypriots living in the North.

(b) Opinion of the Commission

157. In its decision on the admissibility the Commission found under Art 26 of the Convention (at para 39 of The Law) "that the remedies indicated by the respondent Government cannot, for the purposes of the present application, be considered as relevant and sufficient and that they need not, therefore, be exhausted."

158. The Commission, in its examination of the merits of this complaint, does not find it necessary to add anything to its finding in the decision on admissibility.

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(1) Final submissions paras 91 et seq.

(2) Cf para 53 above.

Chapter 4. - Discrimination

(a) Submissions

159. The applicant Government submit (1) that, in as much as the above violations were directed against members of one of the two communities in Cyprus, namely the Greek Cypriot community because of their ethnic origin, race and religion, the respondent Government should be found responsible for continuing violations of Art 14 of the Convention in failing to secure the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention without discrimination on the grounds of ethnic origin, race and religion as required by that Article.

160. The respondent Government did not participate in the proceedings on the merits.

(b) Opinion of the Commission

161. The Commission recalls that, in its Report on Applications Nos 6780/74 and 6950/75 (at para 503), having found violations of a number of Articles of the Convention, it noted that the acts violating the Convention were exclusively directed against members of one of the two communities in Cyprus, namely the Greek Cypriot community. The Commission then concluded that Turkey had thus failed to secure the rights and freedoms set forth in these Articles without discrimination on the grounds of ethnic origin, race and religion as required by Art 14 of the Convention.

162. Having again found violations of the rights of Greek Cypriots under a number of Articles of the Convention in the present case, the Commission does not consider it necessary to add anything to its finding under Art 14 in the previous case.

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(1) Final submissions para 97.

Chapter 5. - Position of Turkish Cypriots

163. The applicant Government allege (1) that, during the relevant period, Turkey committed continuous violations of the rights of the Turkish Cypriots living in the occupied area by her policy and operation of colonisation and her policy and measures of segregation by the force of arms of the two communities within the Cyprus population on the basis of what came to be known as the "Attila line". These violations fall under two categories: various systematic acts of violence, threats, insults, and other oppressive acts by Turkish settlers from Turkey, encouraged and or countenanced by the presence of the Turkish troops, and prevention of any return by Turkish Cypriots, who were transferred from the Government controlled area in 1974-75 to the occupied area, to their homes and properties in the Government controlled area and denial of any exercise of their rights in respect of such property. In respect of both the above categories of violations no effective remedy before any authority exists.

The applicant Government submit that the above facts constitute continuous violations of Arts 3, 5, 6 and 8 of the Convention and Art 1 of Protocol N° 1.

164. The respondent Government, at Annex I (para 91) of their observations on the admissibility (1), submitted that the above complaint was "another example of the insincere and dishonest way in which those who have tried to annihilate the Turkish Community and have caused them to suffer all sorts of hardships, now, for purely propaganda purposes, express false and mock concern for the well-being of the Turkish Cypriots."

165. The Commission, having regard to the material before it, finds that it does not have sufficient available evidence enabling it to come to any conclusion regarding this complaint.

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(1) Final submissions paras 98 et seq.

PART IV - CONCLUSIONS

The Commission,

Having examined the allegations in this application (see Parts II and III above);

Having found that Art 15 of the Convention does not apply (see Part I, Chapter 4);

Arrives at the following findings and conclusions:

1. Missing persons (para 123 above)

The Commission, having found it established in three cases, and having found sufficient indications in an indefinite number of cases, that Greek Cypriots who are still missing were unlawfully deprived of their liberty, in Turkish custody in 1974, noting that Turkey has failed to account for the fate of these persons, concludes by 16 votes against one that Turkey has violated Art 5 of the Convention.

2. Displacement of persons and separation of families (paras 135, 136 above)

The Commission concludes, by 13 votes against two with two abstentions that, by her continued refusal to allow over 170,000 Greek Cypriots the return to their homes in the North of Cyprus, Turkey continues to violate Art 8 in all these cases.

The Commission further concludes by 14 votes against two and with one abstention, that, in the cases of continued separation of families resulting from Turkey's refusal to allow the return of Greek Cypriots to their family members in the North, Turkey continues to violate Art 8 of the Convention.

3. Deprivation of possessfons (para 155 above)

The Commission concludes, by 13 votes against one and with three abstentions, that Turkey has violated Art 1 of Protocol N° 1.

4. Absence of remedies (para 158 above)

The Commission, in its examination of the merits of this complaint, does not find it necessary to add anything to its finding in the decision on admissibility.

5. Discrimination (para 162 above)

Having again found violations of the rights of Greek Cypriots under a number of Articles of the Convention in the present case, the Commission does not consider it necessary to add anything to its finding under Art 14 in the previous case.

6. Position of Turkish Cypriots (para 165 above)

The Commission, having regard to the material before it, finds that it does not have sufficient available evidence enabling it to come to any conclusion regarding this complaint.

Secretary to the Commission

(H.C. KRUGER)

President of the Commission

(C.A. NØRGAARD)